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Developmental Systems Theory Formulated as  
a Claim About Inherited Representations 
NICHOLAS SHEA 
 
 
Abstract 
Developmental Systems Theory (DST) emphasises the importance of non-genetic 
factors in development and their relevance to evolution. A common, deflationary 
reaction is that it has long been appreciated that non-genetic factors are causally 
indispensable.  This paper argues that DST can be reformulated to make a more 
substantive claim: that the special role played by genes is also played by some (but 
not all) non-genetic resources.  That special role is to transmit inherited 
representations, in the sense of Shea (2007: Biology and Philosophy, 22, 313-331).  
Formulating DST as the claim that there are non-genetic inherited representations 
turns it into a striking, empirically-testable hypothesis, driving the sort of 
investigations that are only now beginning to appear in the scientific literature.  
DST’s characteristic rejection of a gene vs. environment dichotomy is preserved, but 
without dissolving all potentially explanatory distinctions into an interactionist causal 
soup, as some have alleged. 
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1 Introduction 
Developmental systems theory (“DST”) has a problem.  Not one of credibility: DST is 
taken seriously by many philosophers and endorsed by some.  Rather it faces a problem 
of perceived inutility.  Despite its empirical roots, it motivates relatively little research.  
That is a loss, because DST carries an important message about the evolutionary 
significance of non-genetic factors, the truth of which is only now being appreciated 
more widely.  Failing to receive credit where it’s due would be merely a pity.  Of more 
consequence is that its perceived lack of utility is continuing to detract from the ability 
of DST to make its case. 
 This paper argues that one element of the DST canon, its rejection of the notion 
of genetic information, has been an obstacle to the theory connecting with its target.  In 
arguing that non-genetic factors are critically important DST has tended to overshoot 
and suggest that all causal factors are on a par.  To make the case against gene-centrism, 
DST should be pointing to the undoubted specialness of genes and saying: ‘You know 
that property, the one that makes genes so special? … Well that property is not just 
found in genes, but in several other factors in development.’  That special role is to 
transmit information, generated through a process of natural selection, down the 
generations to inform development.  This paper makes use of my treatment of inherited 
representations (Shea 2007) to give an account of that role. 
 Relying on a notion of genetic representation will be anathema to many DST 
theorists (Moss 2001), especially Susan Oyama, who identifies information talk as the 
source of gene-centrism and genetic determinism (Oyama 1985).  The claim that genes 
transmit inherited representations does not have these consequences, so this is intended 
as a friendly amendment.  The research programme of DST can survive even if we don’t 
accept the rejection of the existence of genetic information that is central to DST’s 
philosophy of nature (following a distinction made by Godfrey-Smith 2001).  The aim is to 
preserve DST’s central insight about the developmental and evolutionary importance of 
non-genetic factors (Griffiths & Gray 1994).  That insight is not yet incorporated into 
the standard orthodoxy of the biological sciences, so there is still work for a 
reinvigorated DST to do. 
 Section 2 argues that DST should go for weaker explanatory parity: that some 
but not all developmental factors are on a par with genes.  Section 3 outlines the theory 
of inherited representations and section 4 shows how it plausibly applies to a tightly-
constrained class of non-genetic factors.  Section 5 canvasses some rival proposals for 
narrowing the parity thesis.  Finally, section 6 argues that inherited representation is 
better-suited to expressing DST’s central hypothesis than are other accounts of genetic 
information.  
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2 Explanatory Parity in DST 
DST encompasses a variety of views.  Our focus is Griffiths and Gray’s parity thesis: 
that genetic and non-genetic factors are on a par in development.  This section sets out 
two versions of the parity thesis and commends the more limited form according to 
which only some other developmental resources are on a par with genes. 
 Factors other than DNA are clearly causally indispensible in the development of 
an organism.  DNA’s initial translation into proteins relies on there already being 
machinery in the zygotic cell to perform that task.  Many other non-DNA factors in the 
cell are also crucial to an organism’s development: DNA methylation patterns and other 
chromatin marks, basal bodies, microtubule organizing centres, cytoplasmic chemical 
gradients, and so on. 
 DST goes further, arguing for the evolutionary importance of developmental 
factors outside the egg.  For example, a supply of vitamin C is crucial to normal 
mammalian development.  Primates’ diet has contained vitamin C for so long that they 
have lost the mammalian ability to synthesise it, making primates reliant on vitamin C in 
their environment.  Hermit crabs’ development depends upon a ready supply of 
appropriate empty shells.  This too has evolutionary significance.  Their use of discarded 
shells, rather than growing their own, is doubtless a trait that has evolved by natural 
selection.  Furthermore, their fitness depends upon which shells are available in the 
local ecology. 
 These kinds of examples lead DST to claim explanatory parity between genes 
and all non-genetic factors: 
The full range of developmental resources represents a complex system that is 
replicated in development. (Griffiths & Gray 1994, p. 275) 
Every element of the developmental matrix which is replicated in each 
generation and which plays a role in the production of the evolved life-cycle of 
the organism is inherited. (Griffiths & Gray 1997, p. 474) 
[DST has] a wider conception of the developmental system, not as emerging 
from interactions between genes, but as emerging from interactions between 
the whole matrix of resources that are required for development.  (Griffiths & 
Gray 2005, p. 423) 
 In these passages DST extends parity very widely.  All factors that are causally 
involved in species-typical development are put on a par.  If that is right, DST appears 
to be saying nothing new.  It has long been clear that development is a complex process 
that depends causally on both genetic and non-genetic factors.  No one doubts that 
organisms would fail to develop normally in the absence of gravity, say (one of DST’s 
examples).  DST seems here to be doing no more than emphasising the causal 
importance of non-genetic factors in development: each is such that some aspect of the 
adaptive phenotype would not develop but for it.  Indeed, Griffiths & Gray sometimes 
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reject the possibility of making a principled distinction according to which only a subset 
of other factors are on a par with genes: 
There is much to be said about the different roles of particular resources.  But 
there is nothing that divides the resources into two fundamental kinds.  
(Griffiths & Gray 1994, p. 277) 
 In other places, DST theorists adopt a weaker parity thesis, according to which 
there are many distinctions that can be made between factors found in a developmental 
system, amongst which some but not all non-genetic factors are on a par with genes 
(Griffiths & Knight 1998, p. 254; the ‘more conservative view’ mentioned in Griffiths 
2001, p. 399).  But they don’t offer a clear account of what distinguishes the special 
developmental causes: if not all, which ones are on a par with genes?  DST theorists 
distance themselves from the claim that ‘genes are not important’, saying that is a 
(common) misunderstanding of their position (Griffiths & Gray 2005, p. 420).  Equally, 
they reject the claim that ‘all developmental causes are of equal importance’ as being a 
parody of their position (Griffiths & Knight 1998, p. 254).  In this more recent work 
Griffiths and his co-authors make clear that the weaker parity thesis best expresses their 
view.  However, to avoid being understood in these ways, DST needs an account of 
what the importance of genes amounts to, in the DST world view, and of why some 
developmental causes are important in the same way.  It could then substantiate a bold 
empirical claim: that there are non-genetic developmental resources which are on a par 
with genes.   
 What, though, is the special property of genes that is shared by some, but not 
all, non-genetic causes in development?  The next section argues that it is to carry 
inherited representations. 
3 Inherited Representations 
This section outlines the argument from Shea (2007) that genes carry inherited 
representations.  We should clear away a preliminary objection.  Information talk in 
biology has various bad associations.  The claim that genes are information-carriers is 
taken by some to imply genetic determinism (cf. Oyama 1985); or that all gene-
environment interactions are additive (cf. Lewontin 1974); or that phenotypes come 
preformed in the genes. 
 I don’t doubt that talk of genetic information can attract these unfortunate 
connotations.  As Griffiths has observed (2005), genetic determinism is a popular idea 
that resolutely refuses to die.  However, ‘inherited representation’ in the theoretical 
sense developed by Shea (2007) does not have these implications.  Genetic 
representations can be false and the instructions they carry can go unsatisfied.  Genetic 
representations do not contain preformed phenotypic outcomes, and they do not 
determine such outcomes.  Nor does the existence of genetic representation presuppose 
that gene-environment interactions are additive.  So these motivations for resisting 
5 | P a g e  
 
information talk furnish no good reason to reject the existence of inherited 
representations in the sense offered here. 
 Griffiths and Gray have a second objection to accounts of genetic information, 
which is that they fail in the stated aim of capturing a special role played by genes.  
There is correlational information whenever, for some univocal reason, the state of one 
system changes the probability that some other system instantiates some property. 
Shannon’s treatment emphasises that the way that the states of two systems correlate 
depends upon which background ‘channel conditions’ are held fixed (Shannon 1949, 
Dretske 1981).  Genes carry information about genotypes in this sense, if we treat the 
circumstances of development as channel conditions which are held fixed.  However, 
Griffiths & Gray (1994) are right to observe that we can equally well fix on the genome 
as a channel condition, against which variations in the developmental environment will 
also carry Shannon-information about phenotypes. 
 In response, various theorists argued that genes carry information in a stronger 
sense than mere correlations – that they carry semantic information, with correctness 
conditions or satisfaction conditions (i.e. that they are representations).  Sterelny, Smith 
& Dickison (1996) and Maynard Smith (2000) founded that claim on evolutionary 
functions – on the function of genes to produce the outcomes for which they have been 
selected.1  These proposals still appeared too liberal, attributing semantic information 
not only to genes, but to every factor in development that has an evolutionary function.  
To counter those objections, Shea (2007) argued that a careful application of the 
framework of teleosemantics to the genome requires more than just evolutionary 
functions.  I differed from earlier authors in taking seriously the need to identify a 
consumer of the representations carried by the genome. 
 The teleosemantic framework applies when there is a consumer system that 
responds to a range of different representations by producing a range of different 
outputs (Millikan 1984).  Teleosemantics naturalises the intuitive idea that a token is a 
representation when a system treats it as a proxy for some further fact C about the 
world.  The system responds to the token in a way that is appropriate, given that C 
obtains.  A gene or genotype G is selected because a phenotypic feature P with which it 
correlates is conducive to some feature C of the environment (including existing 
features of the organism).  G is then transmitted down the generations so that 
descendant organisms continue to develop phenotype P.  Doing so will be adaptive 
while condition C continues to obtain.  If it were right to characterise the production of 
P by the mechanisms of development, on the basis of reacting to G in the zygote, as the 
operation of a consumer system that takes G as input, then it would follow from 
teleosemantics that G represents that C obtains. 
                                                       
1  Jablonka (2002) also made an ingenious appeal to teleofunctions, but in the service of indicative 
rather than imperative contents. 
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 Is there, then, a consumer for the selected genes which are transmitted to the 
zygotes of future generations?  Is there a system that has the function of responding to a 
range of different genotypes by producing a range of different outputs?  Shea (2007) 
argues that such a consumer can only be discerned from the perspective of evolutionary 
time.  A single individual has access just to one set of zygotic DNA, but over 
phylogenetic time within a lineage, development in different individuals encounters a 
range of different genotypes and produces a range of different adaptive phenotypes in 
response.  Viewed over phylogenetic time, development seems to be acting as a 
consumer.  But is that its function?  Does development have the evolutionary function 
of responding to a range of different genotypes with a range of different phenotypes? 
 That is a very demanding constraint.  Godfrey-Smith (1999) argues that, in 
addition to functions of particular genes (his option A), DNA in general may have 
adaptive functions (option B).  Particular genes that are the basis of heritable 
phenotypes, and have been selected, have teleofunctions under option A.  But the there 
is also evidence that the DNA system as a whole, with its mechanisms of transcription, 
translation and replication, and of proofreading and repair, also has a teleofunction 
under option B: the function of transmitting phenotypes down the generations.  That 
function is a higher-order or meta-level function, in that it is not the function to 
produce any particular object-level trait X, but to produce whatever traits have been 
selected.  Developmental resources that have this metafunction are inheritance systems.  If 
the genome and the associated machinery of development is an inheritance system, then 
development does indeed have the metafunction of responding to a range of different 
genotypes with a range of different phenotypes.  So it would qualify as a genuine 
consumer system. 
 It is a substantial, but plausible, empirical commitment of the theory that DNA 
does have this metafunction.  Bergstrom & Rosvall (forthcoming) point out that DNA is 
extraordinarily good at storing and transmitting an arbitrary sequence, since it is inert, 
structurally stable and very easy to replicate, and can store a long and indefinitely 
extensible sequence in a small space.  These features do not yet show that DNA has our 
exotic metafunction, because they may just be the cause of the powerful evolution we 
have on earth, without being the consequence of some earlier evolutionary process.  
Maynard Smith & Szathmáry (1995) go further, arguing that DNA-based inheritance 
evolved out of an RNA world because of the increased fidelity with which DNA 
transmits selected phenotypes down the generations.  Furthermore, there are two 
stronger lines of evidence that do not depend on the origins of DNA being based on 
selection for the metafunction. 
 It is likely that the DNA transmission system has been modified in various ways 
in order to perform the metafunction of transmitting selected phenotypes.  First, the 
mechanisms of DNA proofreading and repair are, very plausibly, adaptations for 
improved transmission fidelity (Alberts et al. 2004, pp. 169-191).  They cannot be 
explained away as adaptations for somatic cell inheritance, since they are also found in 
single-celled organisms.  The second line of evidence turns on the degrees of freedom in 
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the code that links nucleotide triplets to amino acids.  The pairings we observe today are 
not based on any chemical specificity between nucleotides and amino acids, but just 
depend upon how the mechanisms of translation are set up.  It seems that there has been 
selection on the triplet-amino acid mapping, sometime in the distant evolutionary past 
(Haig and Hurst 1991, Freeland and Hurst 1998).  Out of all the millions of possible 
triplet-amino acid codes, it seems that the code we have is optimised to reduce the 
impact of common replication errors (as well as translation errors).  The most common 
errors produce amino acids with similar chemical properties, hence proteins with 
similar enzymatic activity.  Both of these modifications of the DNA-development system 
suggest that it has evolved to perform the metafunction of transmitting selected 
phenotypes, irrespective of why it originally came into existence.2  An analogy is the 
way we stick a piece of felt onto a rock to make it function as a good paperweight. 
 Given the metafunction, teleosemantics shows how zygotic DNA carries 
representational content.  A gene G is selected for a heritable phenotypic difference P 
that it makes (in a certain population, across the range of environments in which they 
were found).3  Once selected, G will then be transmitted to the zygotic DNA of 
generations of future organisms, which will continue to develop phenotype P.  G may 
subsequently come to be causally involved in very many phenotypic effects, in 
combination with other genes or features of the environment, but according to the 
standard modern synthesis there is a fact of the matter about the phenotypic effect P for 
which it was originally selected.  There is also a fact about the conditions of the selective 
environment that were conducive to P (why there was selection for P).  Only when that 
condition C obtains does P continue to perform its function in an evolutionarily normal 
way (i.e. in the way that accounts for its having been selected).  The obtaining of C is a 
success condition for the output P that the consumer system produces in response to G.  
It follows that G has the indicative content C is the case.  And the consumer must 
continue to produce P in response to G if it is to perform its function in an evolutionary 
normal way.  So teleosemantics also ascribes to G the imperative content develop P.  The 
indicative content will be false if the environment changes so that C no longer obtains; 
and the imperative content will go unsatisfied if, because of error or subsequent 
selection, development fails to produce P in response to G. 
 One of the starting points for the account of genetic representation in Shea 
(2007) was Moss’s (2001) influential distinction between the gene-D (the causal role of 
a molecular gene in development) and the gene-P (genetic differences that correlate 
                                                       
2  There is a legitimate question about how such selection could have happened.  Lineage-based 
selection is a candidate, especially since DNA’s metafunction is likely to be evolutionarily 
ancient, coming before the evolution of multicellularity.  An alternative is that the benefits in 
long-run fitness achieved through improvements in transmission fidelity can be an effective way 
for machinery with such a metafunction to evolve, if the short-run fitness costs of increased 
fidelity are zero or very small. 
3  The same story applies to asexual organisms, but at the level of the whole genome, in virtue of 
selection between different genomes. 
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with phenotypic differences).  Moss makes a detailed critique of the gene-as-information 
based on the relative rarity of genes-P for interesting phenotypes (genetic diseases 
aside), and offers DST the non-informational gene-D instead.  Shea (2007) argues that 
genetic representation is based, not on current genes-P, but on the existence of a gene-
P at the time when a phenotype was selected, as required for evolution by natural 
selection.  That opens up a substantial notion of gene-as-information that DST can make 
use of. 
 In some cases, G may have been selected because it produced a range of 
phenotypic effects (P1, …, Pn), each being conducive to different features of the 
selective environment (C1, …, Cn).  In that case we need a more complex sentence to 
capture the content of G: C1 & … & Cn is the case; develop P1 or … or Pn.  In cases of 
adaptive plasticity, the different phenotypic effects may be adapted to variable features 
of environment (V1, … Vn), with development being cued to variations in the 
environment in some way. If G is selected for these reasons, it will come to carry the 
content: V1 or … or Vn is the case; develop P1 if V1, …, Pn if Vn. 
 Notice that, even if a gene is selected for a range of phenotypic effects, this is a 
small subset of the phenotypes in which it is involved causally.  Pleiotropy and polygeny 
are ubiquitous, so most genes will be involved in the production of very many different 
phenotypes, and most phenotypes depend on the expression of very many different 
genes.  Nevertheless, the evolutionary story about why a given gene was selected 
involves only a small subset of these effects.  In any particular case it may be very hard 
to tell why a given gene was selected, but if evolutionary orthodoxy is even roughly 
true, then there has been cumulative selection with genes each being selected for some 
relatively small number of phenotypes. 
 Relatedly, observe that the sense in which genes represent phenotypes does not 
imply a tight causal connection between genes and phenotypes.  Natural selection just 
requires a gene-phenotype correlation to be heritable.  That connection may be 
completely contingent, being highly dependent on particular features of the 
environment in which it was selected (that happened to be stable enough at the time of 
selection).  It may also depend heavily on the genetic background against which that 
variation occurred.  So when a genotype G represents a particular phenotype P, it in no 
way follows that G specifies P, or causally determines P in any environments outside the 
range in which it was selected.  Even the language of G ‘programming for’ P suggests 
some kind of tight causal connection between genotype and phenotype.  The notion of 
inherited representation does not have those consequences. 
 One of the motivations for DST was Lewontin’s criticism of the ‘lock and key’ 
model of evolution (Griffiths & Gray 2005, p. 418).  Lewontin (1982, 1983) argued 
that thinking of organisms as being adapted to pre-existing niches or available ways of 
life underestimates the extent to which organisms construct their own niches.  Our 
approach to genetic representation can capture such cases, where the indicative content 
is some very general fact about the environment, but the imperative content is a rich 
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specification of a particular phenotype.  That is a further strand of DST that can be 
nicely expressed using the concept of inherited representation. 
 This paper aims to show that a teleosemantic account of inherited 
representation is adequate to the task of expressing the fundamental insight of DST.  I 
do not argue that no other account of genetic representation could do so.  I deal with 
the main rivals in the literature, but it remains open that a different account of genetic 
representation, grounded for example in control theory, may turn out to be adequate to 
the same task.  If I am wrong about DNA’s metafunction then another account of 
inherited representation would needed if it is to be used to precisify the claims of DST 
(the unavailability of which might then motivate a strong version of the parity thesis). 
4 Inherited Representations in Other Inheritance Systems 
My account of inherited representation is defended in detail in Shea (2007), but the 
outline above is enough to see how it applies to some, but by no means all, other causal 
factors in development.  The crucial issue is whether a developmental resource is part of 
an inheritance system, that is, whether it has the metafunction of transmitting selected 
phenotypes down the generations.  Only then will it carry inherited representations. 
 An example illustrates that many functionally-important causal factors are 
excluded.  In Drosophila melanogaster the way the embryo differentiates into different cell 
types, so as to form the insect’s gross morphology, is driven by concentration gradients 
of various proteins in the embryo.  Initially, these come from maternally-derived 
morphogens (mRNA and the proteins themselves) placed directly into the cytoplasm of 
the zygote.  So initial morphological development is not under the causal influence of 
the zygote’s own DNA.  Maternally-derived morphogens are part of the zygote’s 
inheritance in a wide sense, but are not heritable.  When experimentally-induced 
variations lead to viable phenotypic differences (with the genetic background held 
fixed), descent stops at the first generation.  The morphogens that the first offspring 
passes to the zygotes it produces depend upon DNA expression, and are independent of 
the configuration of morphogens it received from its mother.  By contrast, genetic 
variation does lead to heritable differences in the way morphogens are passed down the 
generations (and in resulting morphology).  These genetic variants are maternal effect 
mutants: the effect of the genetic variation is first seen in offspring, and is then carried 
down the generations (Weber 2005, ch. 8). 
 Maternally-derived morphogens are causally indispensable to the organism’s 
development.  They count as ‘inherited’ on the wide understanding adopted by DST.4  
But they are of only very limited significance to evolutionary questions, since changes in 
morphogen gradients are not transmitted far into the future unless those changes are 
based upon genetic changes.  They are part of the causal background to the organism’s 
                                                       
4  Griffiths (2001) treats as inheritance ‘any biological mechanism which produces resemblances 
between parents and offspring’ (pp. 399-400). 
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development, along with myriad other crucial causal factors; but their limited 
evolutionary significance is reflected in the fact that they do not carry inherited 
representations. 
 On the other hand, inherited representations are likely to be carried by factors 
other than the genome.  Recent years have seen an explosion of research on 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance: mechanisms by which the state of activity of 
genes is passed on to future generations.  For example, gene expression is modulated by 
modifications to the DNA envelope, including through methylating stretches of 
chromatin.  The wealth of evidence summarised in Jablonka & Raz (2009) shows that 
epigenetic effects are found in almost every form of life, and that many are very long-
lasting.  Given their ubiquity, it is very likely that, as with DNA, there has been 
selection on epigenetic mechanisms like chromatin marking for the way they transmit 
selected phenotypes down the generations. So it is very plausible that some epigenetic 
mechanisms form an inheritance system, and so carry inherited representations. 
 Compare cell membrane structures.  When the zygote divides to form a multi-
celled embryo, it needs to synthesise new cell walls.  That process crucially depends on 
the structure of the zygote’s own cell wall and associated elements like centrioles and 
microtubule organising centres (which were constructed for the zygote by its mother 
and which it ‘inherits’ in DST’s broad sense). Unlike the morphogen gradients in 
Drosophila, some changes to cell wall structures may be heritable, giving rise to long 
term differences in generations of descendants.  (Such differences can thus be subject to 
natural selection.)  However, it is much less plausible that cell walls have the relevant 
metafunction.  It is unlikely that there has been selection on this system for the way it 
transmits phenotypes in general down the generation, especially as the range of 
variation of outcomes is limited.  So it is unlikely that cell wall structures are inheritance 
systems, falling into the class of interesting cases that make DST a thesis with strong 
empirical bite. 
 A final example is learning by imitation.  Here, plausibly, evolution has 
invented a new channel or channels of inheritance; but the test is demanding.  Very 
many kinds of socially-mediated learning give rise to behavioural traditions, even 
through low-level social phenomena like local enhancement (Avital & Jablonka 2000).  
Once there are transmitted heritable differences, natural selection may act to select the 
fitter variant (Mameli 2004), but there are few examples in other animals of cumulative 
selection of behavioural phenotypes that build upon one another,5 without the operation 
of gene-based selection.  That is much more likely to occur if the learning mechanism 
has been adapted to the function of transmitting selected (behavioural) phenotypes 
down the generations. 
 There is some evidence that there is a form of imitative learning, at least in 
humans, that has been adapted to perform this function (Shea 2009).  Humans exhibit 
                                                       
5  See the examples in Avital & Jablonka (2000). 
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‘blind over-imitation’, copying the details of the way an observed action is performed, 
even though they can see a more efficient route to the same result.  By contrast, chimps 
go directly for the demonstrated outcome, cutting out unnecessary actions and 
employing the most efficient means of achieving the reward.  There is even evidence for 
a developmental trajectory in humans, with younger children performing more like 
chimps and the disposition for blind over-imitation emerging only between three and 
five years old (Whiten et al. 2009).  At first glance, the chimps have the more rational 
strategy.  If you can see an easier way of reaching the result, why copy additional details 
of the demonstrator’s action-sequence?  On reflection, though, we can see that the 
human strategy could be an adaptation for transmission fidelity.  It allows behavioural 
phenotypes to be transmitted down the generations even if their utility cannot be 
checked by any individual – which would be useful if the advantages of the behavioural 
variant are too long-term or stochastic to be reliably detectable by an individual (e.g. 
the long-term benefits of particular food preparation practices).  By contrast, chimps 
appear to be learning for themselves, using observed behaviour as helpful cue.  The 
otherwise-puzzling disposition for blind over-imitation, together with some other 
features of human imitative learning, suggest that it may have been modified in order to 
perform the function of transmitting selected behavioural phenotypes (Shea 2009).  In 
that case it is a further inheritance system: an additional channel by which information, 
generated by a process of selection over many generations, is transmitted to future 
generations to allow them to produce adaptive phenotypes. 
 This summary of other putative inheritance systems suggests that the parity 
thesis is correct, on the weaker reading (Griffiths 2001, p. 396): a defensible notion of 
genetic information does also apply to other causal factors in development, like 
chromatin marking.  That was a prescient insight of DST.  The theory’s only mistake 
was, at times, to take such examples to motivate an overly inclusive parity thesis.  There 
is no good reason to treat environmental resources like the shells used by hermit crabs, 
or primates’ dietary vitamin C, as carrying information down the generations in any 
substantive sense.  Inherited information sharply delineates a subclass of resources that 
have important explanatory status. 
 With the recent upwelling of research discovering extragenetic mechanisms of 
inheritance all over the place, it is easy to forget just how unorthodox the DST message 
originally was.  DST traces its roots back to Lehrman in the 1950s, and the 
developmental psychobiology of Gottlieb in the 1960s (Griffiths & Gray 2005, p. 418), 
when extragenetic inheritance was decidedly a minority interest.  Gene-centrism 
became, if anything, only more dominant with the success of models of gene-based 
selection in the 1970s (e.g. of altruism) and the rise of molecular biology in the 1980s.  
DST theorists faced a formidable task to persuade the biological community that 
extragenetic inheritance was more than a rare curiosity.  In the ten years between 
Jablonka & Lamb’s 1995 and 2005 books the tide began to turn in favour of the 
prevalence and importance of mechanisms of extragenetic inheritance.  That prescient 
insight should be DST’s key message.  It is succinctly captured by the claim that, in 
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addition to the genome, there are other developmental factors which carry inherited 
representations. 
5 Rival Candidates for Narrowing the Parity Thesis 
5.1 Three nested classes 
So far we have seen that inherited representation is eminently suited to formulating 
DST’s thesis about the developmental and evolutionary importance of non-genetic 
factors.  In this section we argue that inherited representation is the best candidate for 
formulating DST as a radical empirical hypothesis. 
 DST is interested in developmental causes that recur in each cycle of 
development, so excludes one-off accidents (Griffiths & Gray 1994, p. 286).  Amongst 
such recurring causal factors we consider three progressive narrowings that form a 
nested set of subclasses: C1, C2 and C3. 
 Some recurring factors are not functional, for example traits that have evolved 
by genetic drift.  DST could formulate its parity thesis as: genes are on a par with all 
other developmental factors that have evolutionary functions (class C1).  Evolutionary 
functions are effects that enter into an explanation of the survival and reproduction of 
the entities which produce those effects.  One of Griffiths & Gray’s examples (1994) is 
the way ducklings’ preference for the maternal call of their own species depends upon 
their hearing their own, different, call while they are still in the egg.  It follows that one 
of the functions of ducklings’ prenatal vocalisations is, surprisingly, to produce a 
preference for the maternal call.  Many of DST’s favourite examples fall into this 
category.  A mother rat’s disposition to lick the genitalia of her male pups has the 
function of promoting the nerve supply needed for normal penile function.  DST also 
wants to treat as functional the interactions between an organism and background 
conditions of its environment: a plant’s location on the earth’s surface where there is 
sun, an animal’s interaction with gravity while it grows, primates’ interaction with 
vitamin C in their fruit diet, and hermit crabs’ interaction with other species’ shells.  
Griffiths & Gray (1994, p. 290-2) emphasise that such processes should be given an 
evolutionary explanation, so they too plausibly fall in class C1. 
 Pointing out that factors other than genes have evolutionary functions is no kind 
of revelation.  In many places, DST theorists focus on a more interesting fact: that there 
are developmental factors other than genes which give rise to heritable phenotypes.  A 
genetic change in the germ line, if viable, causes a phenotypic difference in a long 
lineage of descendants.  Recall the morphogen gradients in Drosophila.  Changing a 
morphogen gradient in the zygote can make a viable phenotypic difference in that 
individual, but goes no further.  Changing a gene whose expression is responsible for 
that morphogen causes a phenotypic effect that is transmitted down the generations.  
When variation in a developmental factor causes phenotypic variation that is heritable, 
natural selection can act, so that the population evolves towards the fitter variant.  
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Evolution crucially depends on the fact that genetic variation produces heritable 
phenotypic variation. 
 In more concessive moments, when DST theorists hint that they don’t really 
think that all developmental resources are on a par, they suggest that this is the class of 
interest.  Gray uses heritability as the acid test of whether developmental resources are 
transmitted extragenetically (Gray 2001, § 9.7, pp. 194-196).  Griffiths lists various 
factors that are on a par with genes ‘on the more conservative view’ and characterises 
them as follows: ‘Changes in these other resources can cause heritable variation that 
appears in all the cells descended from that egg cell’ (Griffiths 2001, p. 400).  That is 
our second candidate narrowing, C2: causes of heritable phenotypic variation.6 
 The examples of class C1 discussed above were chosen so as to fall outside class 
C2.  C2 also excludes some other cases from the DST literature, for example, some 
varieties of niche construction.  A new termite colony gets a head start in life if it can 
inhabit an existing termite mound, but changes made directly to the mound are not 
preserved and transmitted down the generations to further colonies in further mounds 
(as they would be if caused by a genetic difference).  Similarly, changes made directly to 
beaver dams are unlikely to be heritable.  Nevertheless, C2 does capture many of DST’s 
most central examples.  Male cowbirds have different song dialects in different regions 
without any relevant genetic differences.  The male learns the regionally-appropriate 
song partly through feedback from females with a preference for the local song.  Given 
this mechanism, changes to the phenotype (the local song dialect) will end up being 
transmitted down the generations. 
 It is unclear that there has been selection between the different songs sung in 
different subpopulations, but where heritable differences do have fitness consequences, 
selection can act, even if there are no relevant genetic differences (Mameli 2004).  
Habitat imprinting is the process by which animals prefer to live in the type of habitat in 
which they grew up.  Apparently, when one population of European mistle-thrushes 
imprinted on parkland, it did better than populations imprinted on forest (cited by 
Immelmann 1975).  The parkland population expanded not because of a genetic 
difference, nor because of continuing transfers from forest populations, but because of 
the increased fitness of those individuals that had acquired the parkland habit from their 
forebears.  Class C2 also covers socially-transmitted food preferences in rats.  A 
disposition to eat what your mother eats will give rise to behavioural traditions and, 
depending upon the extent of individual learning, selection could act on those 
differences.  Griffiths & Gray argue that cuckoo-like brood parasitism in viduine finches 
shows selection on imprinting-based variants (2004, pp. 289-90).  Offspring lay their 
eggs in the nest of the species which brought them up, and there are different subspecies 
                                                       
6  Once a heritable phenotype has been genetically selected, it may cease to be heritable, both 
because of subsequent pleiotropy and epistasis, or because of changes in the make-up of the 
population or developmental environment.  The selected gene will continue to be a cause of the 
transmission of the selected phenotype down the generations. 
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imprinted on parasitizing different host species (although in this case there are 
genetically-based morphological differences as well). 
 These examples fall into the very broad class of Darwinian processes (Godfrey-
Smith 2007), and they are clearly of importance in characterising the evolutionary 
dynamics.  As with any kind of learning, they change the space of possibilities that lie on 
accessible evolutionary trajectories. But imprinting is an extremely limited mechanism 
for passing on adaptive phenotypes.  When a population becomes imprinted on a new 
habitat or resource the previous phenotype is replaced.  No accumulation of adaptations 
is possible.  Most of the pattern can be understood as a consequence of a genetically-
based adaptation for habitat imprinting.  DST’s fire ant example is similar.  Whether a 
queen is large and monogynous or small and polygynous depends upon a pheromone 
that is produced by and persists in the respective colonies.  Thus, the phenotypic 
difference is heritable because of an environmental factor, the pheromone, that is 
transmitted down the generations.  But again, this is a very limited system of heredity.  
Although the pheromonal differences may be used to trigger a variety of changes, there 
is only a very limited range of variation in the transmitted resource (the pheromone). 
 In their most concessive moments, some DST theorists seem to be pointing to 
something much more radical.  Gray (2001, p. 202) argues that DST research should 
‘investigate whether there are adaptive mechanisms for passing on extragenetic 
inheritance’ (emphasis added).  If there are other mechanisms for passing on selected 
phenotypes, in addition to genes, then they would show more than the limited selection 
between exclusive alternatives illustrated by imprinting.  They would enable the 
accumulation of adaptations.  This is the most restrictive narrowing, class C3: the class 
of interest for DST should be mechanisms with the evolutionary function of transmitting 
selected phenotypes down the generations.  Sterelny (2001) argues for a related 
distinction based on evolvability – as we will see in the next subsection. 
5.2 Class C3 vs. inherited representation 
C3 is the class of factors which have the metafunction we relied on earlier as 
underpinning the existence of inherited representations (section 3).  We saw in section 
4 that there are plausible examples of non-genetic factors with this metafunction 
(chromatin marking, blind over-imitation in humans).  If the importance of class C3 is 
accepted, we are most of the way home.  The only remaining question is: what is the 
benefit of using informational properties to draw the relevant distinction (as we do in 
section 3) – of formulating DST’s hypothesis in terms of inherited representations? 
 We offer three reasons for understanding inheritance systems (class C3) as 
information channels.  The first is that evolution does not just depend upon selection 
and the generation of etiological functions, but also requires information generated by 
selection to be preserved and transmitted over very many generations.  The process of 
differential survival and reproduction – selection – generates information about which 
phenotypic variants are better suited to the environments in which they exist.  Life can 
only evolve if that information is somehow transmitted to subsequent generations.  
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DST’s message about the evolutionary importance of non-genetic factors is at its 
strongest when we see that factors in class C3 can solve this informational problem: 
DNA is a wonderful solution, but there are others too.  C3 factors are rightly 
considered to be new information channels in their own right, precisely because the 
metafunction that is definitive of class C3 underpins inherited representation. 
 At one point, Griffiths & Gray appear to accept an informational take on 
heredity, as one of many distinctions that can legitimately be drawn between different 
causal factors involved in development.  Although sticking to DST’s overall claim that 
no dichotomy between different factors in development should be privileged, Griffiths 
& Gray accept that a distinction between sample-based and information-based heredity 
may be useful for some purposes (2005, p. 420). 
 Second, it is becoming increasingly clear how right DST theorists were about 
the number of different means by which parents have long-lasting influences on their 
offspring (Jablonka & Lamb 1995, 2005; and the very many examples in Jablonka & Raz 
2009).  Information is useful as a common denominator by which all these different 
systems of heredity can be compared (Jablonka & Lamb 2007, p. 382).   
 The third point relies on the more controversial claim that inherited 
representations are read in the course of individual development.  Understanding class 
C3 in informational terms allows us to see that inheritance channels are one of several 
different sources of information that inform individual development, alongside 
detecting adaptively-relevant information in the individual’s own environment (adaptive 
phenotypic plasticity) and receiving informational cues from the previous generation 
(cross-generational phenotypic plasticity).  Space permits only an outline of that claim 
here.  The idea is most simply explained using a gene-based example, but exactly the 
same point carries over to DST’s examples of other inheritance systems that have been 
adapted for transmitting selected phenotypes. 
 The idea stretches back to the later Lorenz (1965), in which he argued that 
organisms inherit genetic information about the type of environment they are likely to 
face, and use it to achieve an adaptive match to their environment.  The explanandum is 
the striking fact that developing organisms manage to arrive at phenotypes which match 
aspects of their environment in functional ways.  For example, the African horseflies of 
the genus Tabanidae pupate in muddy pools (Lambourn 1930).  The larva constructs a 
cylinder consisting of two corkscrew spirals drilled in opposite directions through the 
mud before forming its pupa in the middle of the cylinder, bottom-centre.  When the 
pool evaporates, and the mud dries out and cracks, the cracks pass neatly around the 
pupa.  The spiral burrowing is thought to be an adaptation to avoid the risk of the 
pupation chamber being split in two by a crack in the surrounding mud.  But how does 
the larva “know”?  That is to say, where does the information come from that tells the 
larva that the pupation chamber it is about to construct is at risk from cracking as the 
mud dries out?  There is a striking match between the larval phenotype (the spiral 
burrowing behaviour) and a property of its future environment (cracking mud).  DST 
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counsels that we should view the organism’s relation to its environment as just another 
aspect of the unfolding complex developmental system.  That perspective overlooks a 
pressing explanandum, not about how the relation evolved, to which DST can offer the 
standard Darwinian answer, but about where the information comes from, in individual 
development, that allows the organism to develop in a way that so exquisitely matches 
its environment.  That explanandum cries out for an informational explanation. 
 In some cases the organism detects the relevant property directly while it is 
developing.  For example, the water flea Daphnia pulex relies on chemical traces of 
predators in the water to tell it whether or not to grow an expensive defensive shell.  In 
Tabanidae natural selection is the more likely culprit.  The standard story about selection 
on randomly-produced genetic variants means that the genotype that gives rise to the 
corkscrew burrowing comes to correlate with a fitness-relevant feature of its 
phylogenetic environment, namely that the pupation environment dries out and cracks.  
That is information in the correlational sense.  The role of information in the proximal 
causal story about fly development is thereby connected with the distal story about the 
origin of that information in phylogenetic history.  So natural selection not only explains 
the adaptation, in the usual way, it also explains how the developing organism manages 
to solve an informational problem.  The organism narrows its uncertainty about the 
nature of the environment in which it will develop by relying on a resource – its 
genotype – that represents a feature of the environment. 
 Where natural selection generates information in other inheritance systems 
(section 4 above), that too informs individual development.  For example, if there has 
been natural selection on variations in transmitted chromatin marks, then the selected 
chromatin mark will carry useful information about the selective environment, which 
will guide the organism towards developing an environmentally-appropriate phenotype.  
Blind over-imitation is another example, although there it is easy to overlook the role of 
selection in generating the information.  At first glance, the imitator seems just to be 
learning from the model.  But recall that the imitator may have no idea why the 
behavioural phenotype is adaptive (e.g. why a particular food preparation practice is 
beneficial, on average in the long run).  There may be no way for an individual to detect 
the adaptive significance of the behaviour, if the feedback is too stochastic or too long-
term for an individual to keep track of.  In such cases, the way the behaviour of the 
model guides the imitator to an adaptive outcome depends upon transmission of 
information that was generated by selection over very many generations in the 
evolutionary past. 
 Cross-generational phenotypic plasticity (Sultan 2000) is closer to the within-
generation process by which the water flea detects an environmental correlate of 
predators than to the transgenerational process by which information generated through 
natural selection is transmitted to future generations.  Many parental effects arise 
because the parent can give its offspring relevant information about its local 
environment.  In plants, parental effects can convey to the developing seedling useful 
information about the kind of local microclimate is it likely to find itself in, and so about 
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which morphological variant or life history strategy it ought to adopt (Galloway & 
Etterson 2007).  The stress-related phenotype expressed in mother rats, that causes the 
offspring in turn to be highly stress-reactive (Meaney 2001), is also plausibly a 
mechanism whereby the mother can pass to her offspring (in a rather unobvious way) 
adaptively-relevant information about the kind of environment they are likely to find 
themselves in.  These are not mechanisms that have been adapted for transmitting 
selected phenotypes (inheritance systems / class C3).  Instead, they are cross-
generational signalling mechanisms by which parents signal an adaptively-relevant 
environmental variable and offspring produce an adaptively-plastic phenotype in 
response (Shea, forthcoming).  They do not carry inherited representations, but are 
examples of a different means by which the developing organism can narrow its 
uncertainty about its developmental environment. 
 In summary, the special role of DNA comes out when we ask an informational 
question.  DST’s insight is that other developmental factors may play that role too. 
6 Other Accounts of Genetic Information 
Other accounts of inherited information have been offered.  Shea (2007) has arguments 
that some of these fail on their own terms, which we will not re-open here.  Others are 
perfectly cogent, but do not capture the sense in which inheritance systems transmit 
representations or semantic information.  In this section we argue that those accounts 
are less well-suited than inherited representation to capturing the important claim at the 
heart of DST. 
 Levy (forthcoming) argues that information talk is a useful metaphor, allowing 
scientists to break down systems into senders and receivers so as to be able to think 
about them more easily.  In Levy’s view the usefulness of such metaphors does not turn 
on genes really carrying representational content.  The metaphor can be applied in very 
many situations.  So it would not help DST in singling out a special class of 
developmental factors about which to make its claim. 
 By contrast, Godfrey-Smith (1999) focuses on a very particular property of 
DNA.  He argues that it is appropriate to talk about DNA in informational terms only 
because of the triplet code, a precise relation of causal specificity between the linear 
order of triplet codons on the DNA molecule and the linear order of amino acids in the 
proteins that are expressed.  Stegmann (2005) argues that the way that DNA determines 
protein products, through template-directed synthesis, makes it an instruction to form 
those products.7  Godfrey-Smith and Stegmann both appeal to very specific features of 
                                                       
7  Stegmann’s ‘instructional content’ turns on the claim that DNA determines the kind and order 
of the operations that will be carried out to produce its protein product.  However, this 
determination only occurs when conditions are right and things go well.  So Stegmann may 
need to appeal to teleology (although not teleosemantics) to specify the circumstances in which 
effects flowing from DNA count as being amongst the ‘determinings’ that are relied on in 
discerning instructional content. 
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the way DNA actually operates, with little prospect of the same properties being 
exemplified by any non-genetic factors.  Neither account is suited to the role of locating 
information in non-genetic resources (rather, they found an argument to the falsity of 
even the weak parity thesis). 
 Kim Sterelny has been involved in the development of a series of views about 
the status of genetic information.  Sterelny & Kitcher (1988) argued that a molecular 
gene codes for a trait relative to a standard background of environment and other genes. 
The problem was to identify the standard in a principled way.  Sterelny, Smith and 
Dickison (1996) relied on teleology, as did Maynard Smith (2000), with genes 
representing the outcomes which it was their etiological function to produce.  As we’ve 
seen, very many developmental factors have evolutionary functions, so these accounts 
over-generate.  Jablonka (2002) relied on evolutionary functions to underpin indicative 
contents for genes, based on ‘interpreting receivers’.  While it is not entirely clear what 
physical system corresponds to the receivers, Jablonka does not have the constraint of 
the metafunction identified by Shea (2007), so her account may also overgenerate.  Nor 
does it capture a sense in which genes have imperative contents. 
 Sterelny (2001) took a different tack, focusing not on representation, but on 
what it is to be a replicator, which he identified as the set of developmental resources 
that are like DNA in being highly evolvable.  A subsidiary point was that such evolvable 
systems are unlikely to have arise by chance, but have probably been adapted for the 
transmission of similarity across the generations – i.e. to be in our class of inheritance 
systems, C3.  Sterelny (2001) did much to spell out the conditions that underpin 
evolvability.  Since carrying inherited representations in our sense is based on a 
mechanism having the metafunction that is evidenced by Sterelny’s evolvability criteria, 
the two accounts will agree about most of the cases – about which factors DST should 
identify as being on a par with genes from an evolutionary and developmental point of 
view.  My account differs from Sterelny in two respects, one local and one global. 
 The local difference is that Sterelny does not think that all inheritance systems 
involve information transfer (pp. 346 & 347).  Those which involve transfer of samples 
from parents to offspring are not cases of information transmission, in his view.  
Sterelny (2004) develops the distinction, spelling out the distinctive evolutionary 
characteristics of sample-based inheritance. 
 In my view, the fact that samples are transferred in a process of inheritance does 
not exclude the fact that information is also transmitted – that the samples carry 
representational content (of our ‘inherited representation’ variety).  There is no such 
exclusion with representation in general.  When I ask a baker ‘what’s good?’ he may 
just pass me a slice of cake.  The cake is a sample, but is also an answer to the question, 
carrying a semantic content along the lines of this is good.  Similarly, some of the 
examples of sample-based inheritance discussed by Sterelny (2001, 2004) are also cases 
where information, generated by a process of selection, is being transmitted to future 
generations.  If they are adapted for the transmission of similarity across generations, as 
19 | P a g e  
 
Sterelny suggests (pp. 338 & 346), these mechanisms are thereby carrying inherited 
representations, for the reasons given in sections 3 and 4 above. 
 Not all the samples which lead to cross-generational similarity will carry 
inherited representations, since some may be a cause of cross-generational similarity 
(class C2) without being an adaptation for transmitting cross-generational similarity 
(C3, which is a proper subset of C2).  In an obligate symbiosis, say between an insect 
species and a particular digestive bacterium, the mechanism for passing on a sample of 
the bacterium in the insect’s eggs does not look to have been designed to carry a range 
of different messages.  Even where there is a range of possible symbionts, as when 
juvenile ruminants ingest faeces to acquire microorganisms that are needed for 
digestion, the case is more like that of imprinting. The mechanism can give rise 
heritable features, but that is not its purpose.  Its evolutionary function is to pass on 
symbiotic microorganisms.  Furthermore, some passing of samples may be cases of 
cross-generational phenotypic plasticity (Sultan 2000 – discussed above).  In any event, 
there does not seem to be anything like the fancy metafunction exemplified by DNA.  
So, while some cases of sample-based heredity do not count as transmitting semantic 
information, some do.  Transfer of samples does not exclude transfer of semantic 
information. 
 So much for the local disagreement with the later Sterelny (2001, 2004).  The 
more global disagreement concerns the importance of information.  Sterelny identifies 
the class of systems that should be of interest to DST directly in terms of conditions on 
evolvability.  While this is evidence of class C3, it is not equivalent.  Furthermore, there 
are explanatory benefits for focusing on the inherited representations which are carried 
by factors in class C3.  The three reasons discussed in section 5.2 above amount to a 
strong argument that formulating DST’s thesis in informational terms is explanatorily 
superior, and better captures the spirit of the DST project. 
7 Conclusion 
Developmental systems theory has championed a research programme focused on 
investigating the developmental and evolutionary importance of factors other than 
genes.  That insight has been vindicated by the recent flowering of empirical work in the 
field.  However, DST’s distinctive contribution has not been brought sharply into focus.  
This paper has argued that a detachable part of the DST canon – a philosophy of nature 
which rejects any appeal to semantic information – has obscured its central insight.  
DST’s claim is not just that non-genetic factors are causally important.  Formulated as a 
claim about inherited representations, DST turns into the striking thesis that some 
factors other than genes also carry genuinely semantic information, in a restricted and 
rather special way.  If that is right, then there is a strong sense in which there are non-
genetic channels of inheritance.  The payoff is that we can use information as a common 
currency to compare inheritance systems, and to understand how information generated 
by the process of natural selection is relied on to guide development towards adaptive 
phenotypes. 
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